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I. INTRODUCTION 
When I surveyed the landscape in 1999, I discovered that “only 
fourteen states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government” had 
laws to compensate individuals who had been unjustly convicted and later 
exonerated.1  Of those, few provided generous awards.2   Most offered 
compensation so skimpy as to be insulting.3  Many statutes were virtually 
inaccessible because they required a gubernatorial pardon.4  To make 
matters worse, some contain inartful language, which permits states to 
argue that a person who confessed or entered a plea of guilty should be 
disqualified from recovering—even if the confession or plea was clearly 
false.5 
 
 1. Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails:  Indemnification for Unjust 
Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 77 (1999). 
 2. See id. at 105-08 (discussing limitations on awards). 
 3. See id. at 105 (“Many states severely and unnecessarily limit the amount 
of recoverable damages.”).  In 1999, California limited awards to $10,000—no matter 
how long the claimant had spent in prison.  Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4900-4906 
(West 1941)).  The statute was amended in 2000 to permit awards of $100 for each day 
of wrongful incarceration.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West Supp. 2004). 
 4. The following states require a pardon:  California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 
4900 (West 2003); Illinois, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (West 1999); Maine, 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241(2)(C) (West 2003); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., 
STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501(b) (2001); and North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 
(2003). 
 5. The following states disqualify persons who have pled guilty or who have 
in some way contributed to their own convictions:  California, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 
4902 (West 2000) (putting the burden on the claimant to prove “he did not . . . 
contribute to the bringing about of his arrest or conviction for the crime with which he 
was charged”); Iowa, see IOWA CODE § 663A.1(1)(b) (2003) (requiring that the 
claimant did not plead guilty in order to qualify as wrongfully convicted); New York, 
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After the publication of When Justice Fails, I anticipated that the 
continuing parade of exonerations, in state after state across the country,6 
would prompt local legislatures to enact new statutes benefiting the 
unjustly convicted and later exonerated in states that lacked such 
mechanisms and to modernize imperfect statutes in states where 
compensation statutes had not been revisited in years.  I was wrong. 
In the last five years, just two additional states—Alabama7 and 
Oklahoma8—have created generous compensation systems, despite new 
studies showing that there may be thousands of innocent people wrongly 
convicted and sentenced to jail.9   Only four states—California,10 Illinois,11 
Ohio,12 and Texas13—have raised dollar limitations on statutory 
compensation awards.14  Other states have engaged in protracted battles 
over legislation, without resolving the disputes.15 
 
see N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 8-b(4)(b) (McKinney 1989) (stating that the claimant 
must prove “he did not by his own conduct cause or bring about his conviction”); New 
Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3(b) (West 2001) (same); Ohio, see OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2743.48(A)(2) (Anderson 2000 & Supp. 2002) (requiring that the claimant did 
not plead guilty in order to qualify as wrongfully convicted); West Virginia, see W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(e)(3) (Michie 2000) (stating that the claimant must not have “by 
his own conduct cause[d] or br[ought] about his conviction”); and Wisconsin, see WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West 2001) (awarding compensation only if the claimant “did 
not by his or her act or failure to act contribute to bring about the conviction and 
imprisonment for which he or she seeks compensation”).  The federal compensation 
statute likewise excludes those who “by misconduct or neglect” caused their own 
prosecution.  28 U.S.C. § 2513 (2000). 
 6. As of April 13, 2004, the Innocence Project at the Cardozo School of Law 
had assisted in the exoneration of 143 wrongfully convicted individuals.  INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, at http://innocenceproject.org/index.php (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). 
 7. ALA. CODE §§ 29-2-150 to -165 (2003). 
 8. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, 154(B)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004). 
 9. Adam Liptak, Study Suspects Thousands of False Convictions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at A15 (discussing a study published by Professor Samuel Gross 
of the University of Michigan). 
 10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004). 
 11. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (West 1999). 
 12. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(E)(2) (Anderson 2000 & Supp. 2002). 
 13. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052 (Vernon Supp. 2004). 
 14. Tennessee’s House and Senate have voted to amend the state statute so as 
to permit awards of up to a million dollars.  H.B. 2859, 103d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Tenn. 2004) (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7) (2003)). The bill is currently 
awaiting the signature of the Speaker of the House and the Governor.  Interview with 
Vanessa Potkin, Staff Attorney, The Innocence Project (May 26, 2004). 
 15. In 2003, the following states introduced compensation bills:  Pennsylvania, 
H.B. 1281, 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003); Louisiana, S.B. 520, 2003 Leg., 
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Even more dishearteningly, since 1999, several states have enacted 
legislation designed not to assist exonerees in a significant way, but only to 
bestow symbolic token support.16  For example, Montana’s new 
“compensation” statute provides only tuition support—no monetary 
assistance.17 
Some states seem to have been designed to protect states against 
envisioned civil litigation.  For example, if Missouri Senate Bill 916 
becomes law, Missouri will compensate for economic loss only and will 
limit economic loss to the amount of income the federal government 
regards as the poverty level plus twenty percent.18  Moreover, the statute 
would specifically forbid a monetary award to compensate for loss of civil 
rights and emotional duress resulting from the wrongful incarceration.19  
Noneconomic loss would be compensated exclusively by job skills training, 
therapy, or other social service programs.20  Virginia has amended its code 
to compensate exonerees by awarding only an amount equal to “90% of 
the Virginia per capita personal income as reported by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis of the United States Department of Commerce for 
each year, or portion thereof, of incarceration up to 20 years.”21  Receipt of 
the award will act as a waiver of the right to sue.22  These cynical, protective 
statutes do not reflect public opinion as expressed by the media, and are 
inconsistent with other progressive reform efforts motivated by 
exonerations across the country.23 
 
Reg. Sess. (La. 2003); Kentucky, H.B. 525, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2003); Mississippi, 
S.B. 2015, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2003); Massachusetts, H.B. 2506, 183d Gen. Ct., 
Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2003).  Kentucky also introduced a bill in 2004.  S.B. 272, 2004 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2004). 
 16. MT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (2003); S.B. 916, 92d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. 
Sess. (Mo. 2004); H.B. 638, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2004); S.B. 271, 2004 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Va. 2004). 
 17. MT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214. 
 18. S.B. 916 (“Economic injury shall be the aggregate of the person’s 
compensation for each year of incarceration based annually on the federal poverty 
level as defined by section 215.235, RsMo, plus twenty percent.”). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. H.B. 638; S.B. 271. 
 22.  H.B. 638; S.B. 271. 
 23. Exonerations have exposed faults in many traditional police procedures.  
Criminal justice activists are encouraging radical reform.  In some localities, that 
reform is happening.  Police departments are experimenting with lineup procedures.  
New Jersey is urging its police to use sequential lineups when possible.  See generally 
JOHN J. FARMER, JR., ATTORNEY GEN., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., ATTORNEY 
GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING PHOTO AND LINEUP 
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As a result of states’ reluctance to compensate, more exonerees are 
turning to the courts for vindication.  Despite the difficulty of bringing 
lawsuits using tort theory or the civil rights laws, exonerees are increasingly 
suing defense lawyers, police, prosecutors, and the agencies that supervise 
and train them.24  Thus far, litigation has yielded mixed results.  Few 
exonerated individuals have been compensated.25  And, while many have 
received nothing, others, no more deserving, have received enormous 
awards.26  The disparity is discouraging for those who have not been 
compensated, complicates the debate over whether and how exonerees 
should be compensated, and symbolizes the arbitrariness and inequality of 
the criminal justice system as a whole. 
With this Article, I hope to motivate state legislators to enact 
responsible, practical compensation statutes and encourage courts to 
entertain state law and civil rights claims brought by those who have been 
unjustly convicted and later exonerated.  I begin by looking at the reasons 
 
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES, available at 
http:/www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf. (Apr. 18, 2001).  Certain localities 
are recording police interrogations.  Courts have required the change in two states:  
Alaska, Stephen v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Alaska 1985); and Minnesota, State v. 
Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Minn. 1994).  In Illinois, the legislature is moving to 
require recording.  S.B. 15, 93d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2003).  Crime 
laboratories may be subjected to standards and serious peer review.  For example, after 
Jimmy Ray Bromgard was exonerated in Montana, after serving over fifteen years in 
prison for a crime he did not commit, a panel of expert forensic scientists reviewed the 
work of the forensic scientist who had allegedly “matched” hairs found at the crime 
scene to Mr. Bromgard.  INNOCENCE PROJECT, JIMMY RAY BROMGARD, at 
http://www.innocence project.org/case/search_profiles.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2004).  
The panel found the work unscientific, as well as wrong and urged the Attorney 
General to create an audit committee to examine the full body of the scientist’s police 
work.  Id. 
 24. See Barry C. Scheck & Peter J. Neufeld, Toward the Formation of 
“Innocence Commissions” in  America, 86 JUDICATURE 98, 104-05 (2002) (noting the 
lack of success of exonerees’ civil rights suits against law enforcement officers and 
prosecutors). 
 25. See Howard S. Master, Note, Revisiting the Takings-Based Argument for 
Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 97, 98 (2004) 
(stating that the vast majority of exonerees have been left uncompensated due to the 
absence of statutes and “[e]xisting constitutional and common-law tort doctrines”). 
 26. For example, Mark Bravo was awarded seven million dollars for three 
years he spent in jail for a crime he did not commit.  Monte Morin, He’s got 7 Million 
Ways to Tell Her ‘I Love You’, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at B21.  James Newsome was 
awarded fifteen million dollars in damages.  Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 307 
(7th Cir. 2003) (affirming a jury verdict awarding Newsome one million dollars for each 
of the fifteen years he served in jail). 
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for enacting compensation statutes: uniformity, practicality, popular 
support, and fairness.  Next, I dissect the arguments raised by opponents.  
Finally, I turn to recent judicial decisions hinting that courts may be 
stepping in where legislatures fear to tread. 
II. COMPENSATION STATUTES 
 The reticence of state governments to assist the unjustly convicted is 
surprising.  The arguments in favor of uniform compensation schemes are 
logically and emotionally persuasive.  As I wrote in 1999: 
The necessary law is simple, clear and effective.  The remedy is not 
expensive and does not require creation of new bureaucratic agencies.  
Most importantly, a legislative remedy is the only reliable and fair 
response to the inevitable mistakes that occur as a byproduct of the 
operation of a criminal justice system as large as ours.  The state whose 
actions have put individuals in prison for crimes they did not commit 
owes a debt to those who through no fault of their own have lost years 
and opportunity.  The debt should be recognized and paid.27 
A.  Statutes Create a Uniform Approach to Compensating the Unjustly 
Convicted 
Compensation statutes bring rationality to a situation that is 
otherwise more akin to a lottery or popularity contest.  In states without a 
uniform system for compensating those who have been wrongly convicted, 
similarly situated individuals can be treated very differently.  Georgia, for 
example, lacks a uniform legislative compensation system.  As a result, 
exonerees have the choice of bringing a lawsuit28 or finding a sponsor 
willing to introduce a private bill in the legislature.29  As of March 1, 2004, 
at least three individuals in Georgia had been exonerated.30 
 
 27. Bernhard, supra note 1, at 73-74. 
 28. Courts are just beginning to relax the barriers that have discouraged 
lawsuits seeking redress for unjust conviction. See discussion infra Part II. 
 29. Private legislative bills “are specially drafted acts generally used to pay 
otherwise unenforceable claims on behalf of individuals harmed by the state.” 
Bernhard, supra note 1, at 93. 
 30. INNOCENCE PROJECT, CALVIN JOHNSON, at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/search_profiles.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2004); 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, DOUGLAS ECHOLS, at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/search_profiles.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2004); 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, SAMUEL SCOTT, at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/search_profiles.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2004). 
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In 1999, Calvin Johnson, a college-educated metro Atlanta man, was 
released after 16 years in prison when DNA tests cleared him of rape 
charges.  Johnson’s positive, forgiving demeanor made him celebrated 
on national TV.  He got a MARTA job, $500,000 from the state, and 
an apology from the district attorney.  He has co-authored a book.31 
A few years later, Sam Scott and Douglas Echols were cleared of a 
1986 rape conviction by DNA testing.32  But, neither has received any 
compensation.33  No lawsuits have been filed.34   No senators have 
volunteered to introduce special bills. 
It may be that the first exoneration grabs more media and public 
attention.  It may be that Calvin Johnson is more personable and attractive 
than either Echols or Scott.  However, those distinctions do not justify the 
difference in treatment.  If there were a uniform statute, each exoneree 
could file a claim.  The effects of politics and personality would be 
minimized. 
B.  Statutes Are Easy to Use and Resolve Claims Rapidly 
 After fourteen years in prison, Larry David Holdren obtained 
permission to retest the forensic evidence material to his conviction.35  
Testing proved that he was not responsible for the crime.36   In 1999, courts 
reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment against him.37  By 
then, Mr. Holdren was forty-four years old.38 
 He brought a claim under the West Virginia compensation statute.39  
Simply by reading Holdren’s uncontested petition, the West Virginia Court 
of Claims concluded the state was liable for the wrongful conviction.40  
 
 31. Bill Torpy, Free Men, Lost Identities; DNA Cleared Them, but Prison Left 
Mark, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 5, 2003, at D1. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Holdren v. State, No. CC-00-461 (W. Va. Ct. Cl. Apr. 2, 2002), available at 
http://129.71.164.29/Court_Claims/CC-00-191.htm. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. To make a compensation most practicable, the official record from the 
prison system confirming the time served in prison, paired with the judgment reversing 
the conviction and dismissing the indictment, should be sufficient to bring the claim 
before the court or administrative agency charged with considering the issue.  See, e.g., 
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Turning to damages, the court pointed out that Mr. Holdren had spent 
fifteen years in prison and had been enrolled in an undergraduate 
university program at the time of his arrest.41  The court heard an 
economist estimate what Mr. Holdren might have been expected to earn 
during the fifteen years if his career plans had progressed uninterrupted.42  
The court considered the claimant’s “impairment of future earnings . . . , as 
well as the loss of reputation, the loss of liberty, emotional stress, pain and 
suffering, and the reputation of the particular facility in which the claimant 
was imprisoned in determining the amount of the award.”43  Finally, the 
court recognized that the claimant had already partially recovered through 
a civil action against a third party and took that into consideration in 
estimating damages.44  In a two-and-one-half-page decision, the court 
determined that the claimant was entitled to an award of $1,650,000, 
approximately $110,000 for each year spent in prison.45 
 Although some might complain that the award was too low, the 
claimant recovered relatively quickly and without having to finance 
complicated litigation.  He was not required to obtain a pardon, which 
might have been impossible.  Finally, the damages, while not copious, were 
sufficient to permit Mr. Holdren to complete school, purchase a home, or 
invest in a business should he so desire—activities he certainly would have 
enjoyed had he not been falsely accused and imprisoned.  The award could 
finance the psychological therapy so many of the exonerated need.46  The 
award provided a foundation upon which to begin to build a life. 
 
W. VA. CODE. ANN. § 14-2-13a(d) (Michie 2000) (setting forth evidence required to 
make a claim for unjust imprisonment).  The proof that convinced the prosecution and 
the court to dismiss should, in most cases, also establish liability.  If the claimant’s 
innocence (and thus the state’s liability) is disputed, a factual hearing must be held.  In 
those circumstances, most states require the claimant to prove innocence by clear and 
convincing evidence.  See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-422 (2004) (stating that a person 
bringing suit for damages under D.C.’s unjust imprisonment statute must prove by 
clear and convincing evidence he or she was unjustly imprisoned); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
14-2-13a(a), (f) (outlining what a claimant must prove by clear and convincing evidence 
to show unjust imprisonment). 
 41. Holdren v. State, No. CC-00-461. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. (granting an award of $1,650,000). 
 46. The PBS Frontline special documentary, Burden of Innocence, detailed 
the many problems faced by those who have served time for crimes they did not 
commit.  Frontline:  Burden of Innocence (PBS television broadcast May 1, 2003), 
available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/burden/view. 
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C.  Compensation Statutes Are Popular 
 Any study of wrongful convictions will find innumerable media 
stories sympathetic to those who have been wrongly convicted.47  If the 
number and length of newspaper, radio, and television stories reflect the 
interest of the community, not only do exoneration narratives have 
immense human interest value,48 but the public overwhelmingly supports 
providing assistance to those who have been harmed by the criminal justice 
system through no fault of their own.  Ofra Bikel has produced three 
documentaries on wrongful convictions for the Public Broadcasting Service 
(PBS).49  Her most recent program, Burden of Innocence, detailed the 
difficulties faced after release from unjust incarceration and explicitly 
called for compensation legislation.50  The North Carolina Winston-Salem 
Journal ran an eight-part series on Darryl Hunt’s twenty-year sojourn from 
accusation to exoneration.51  The newspaper’s website provides links to 
stories, video interviews with witnesses, photographs of the evidence 
introduced at trial, and the actual documents used to win Hunt’s release.52  
It closes with a quote from the local district attorney, Tom Keith, who 
finally acquiesced to the exoneration and recommended that Darryl Hunt 
be compensated:  “It is important that the system make amends for the 
system.”53 
 
 47. I have been interviewed numerous times by reporters curious about 
whether persons who have been unjustly convicted and later exonerated will receive 
compensation.  When I inform them that few are, the reporters are inevitably shocked. 
 48. The Pulitzer Prize has been awarded twice to newspaper reporters for 
investigative journalism leading to the exoneration of individuals convicted of serious 
crimes.  Paul Henderson of the Seattle Times won in 1982 for reporting that proved the 
innocence of a man convicted of rape, 1982, at http://www.pulitizer.org (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2004), and John Woestendiek of the Philadelphia Inquirer won in 1987 for 
reporting that included proving the innocence of a man convicted of murder, 1987, at 
http://www.pulitizer.org (last visited Apr. 22, 2004). 
 49. Frontline, supra note  46. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Murder, Race, Justice:  The State v. Darryl Hunt, The Stories, at 
http://darrylhunt.journalnow.com/frontStories.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2004) 
(providing information about the series authored by Phoebe Zerwick). 
 52. See Murder, Race, Justice:  The State v. Darryl Hunt, at 
http://darrylhunt.journalnow.com (last visited Apr. 22, 2004). 
 53. Phoebe Zerwick, Keith to Plead for a Hunt Pardon, WINSTON-SALEM J., 
Feb. 19, 2004, available at http://darrylhunt.com/epilogue/epilogueprint41.html.  
Numerous other print journalists have made the same pitch.  E.g., Lou Hanson, Bring 
Uniformity to Compensation Bills, VIRGINIAN PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), Jan. 12, 2004, at 
B10; Brendan McCarthy, House Passes Wrongful Conviction Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Oct. 23, 2003, at B4; Curtis Stephen, Wrongly Imprisoned Deserve Compensation, 
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 Popular support is largely responsible for the few new statutes 
enacted in the past five years.  Despite five exonerations, Alabama had no 
uniform compensation system until the media focused on the case of 
Walter McMillian.54  When Walter McMillian was finally released from 
prison,55 after revelations that police had coerced a confession from the 
“witness” who implicated him and failed to disclose other exculpatory 
information to the defendant,56 the Birmingham News published a series of 
articles and editorials.57   Only then did Alabama enact a statute that 
 
NEWSDAY (Long Island, N.Y.), Feb. 17, 2004, at A23; John Wilkens, Freedom From 
Prison is Little Relief for the Falsely Accused, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 15, 2003, 
at E1; Andrew Wolfson, Kentucky, Indiana Not Among States Compensating 
Exonerated Inmates, COURIER J. (Louisville, Ky.), July 1, 2001, at 1A. 
 54. LaJuana S. Davis, Discovery in Criminal Cases:  Obtaining Evidence and 
Information Necessary for an Effective Defense, 58 ALA. LAW. 352, 352 (1997).  Mr. 
McMillan’s conviction was reversed on appeal.  McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1993).  The five prior exonerations included:  Clarence Brandley, who had 
spent nearly ten years in prison, most of it on death row, until he was exonerated in 
1990, e.g., Betty B. Fletcher, The Death Penalty in America:  Can Justice Be Done?, 70 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 811, 822 (1995) (citing MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF 
INNOCENCE:  ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES 119-36 (1992));  Randall 
Padgett, who was acquitted after his capital murder conviction and death sentence 
were overturned in 1995, e.g., Taylor Bright, Guilty Until Proven Innocent?, 
BIRMINGHAM POST-HERALD, available at 
http://www.patrickcrusade.org/execution_2_5.htm (last visited May 28, 2004); Ronnie 
Mahan and Dale Mahan, who had spent over twelve years in prison before they were 
released in 1998, after  the help of the Innocence Project in New York and DNA 
evidence established their innocence, e.g., INNOCENCE PROJECT, DALE MAHAN, at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/search_profiles.php (last visited Apr. 22, 2004); 
and  Freddie Lee Gaines, who was convicted of two murders in 1972 and not released 
until 1985, e.g., After 13 Years in Prison, Innocent Man Says Alabama ‘Owes Me’, CHI. 
TRIB., Feb. 14, 1991, at 26, available at 1991 WL 9350750.   Five years later, another 
man confessed to the crimes.  Id.   Of all these exonerees, only Freddie Gaines was 
compensated.  See Phillip Rawls, Legislature Votes to Give $1 Million to Wrongfully 
Convicted Minister, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 9, 1996, available at 1996 WL 4428836 
(outlining the compensation received by Gaines).  In 1996, the Alabama Legislature 
passed a private bill awarding Gaines $100,000 per year for ten years.  Id. 
 55. McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d at 949 (reversing the conviction because 
McMillian was denied due process of law). 
 56. Mr. McMillian was convicted of capital murder and spent six years on 
death row before an attorney representing him on appeal made a startling discovery. 
See Davis, supra note 54, at 352.  Counsel was listening to a cassette tape that recorded 
statements made by one of the state’s main witnesses.  Id.  The statement ended before 
the tape switched off, but counsel did not jump up immediately to stop the tape player.  
Id.  After a few minutes, the witness’s voice returned—only now, he was complaining 
that the police were forcing him to implicate McMillian.  Id. 
 57. E.g., Editorial, Just Compensation Panel on Wrongful Convictions Should 
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requires the state to pay a minimum of $50,000 dollars per year to anyone 
who has been wrongly convicted and later exonerated.58 
Similarly, in Ohio, the limits on compensation awards were raised 
from a cap of $25,000, plus lost wages and attorney fees, to $40,333 a year, 
plus lost wages,59 after a series of prizewinning newspaper articles by 
Connie Schultz in the Cleveland Plain Dealer.60  If the press represents 
public opinion, the public supports laws that provide fair and reasonable 
compensation for those who have been unjustly convicted and later 
exonerated. 
D.  The Opposition to a Legislative Solution 
 State lawmakers who have tried to generate interest in compensation 
statutes report that the opposition raises two arguments.61  First, some 
contend that the statutes will be increasingly expensive as an ever larger 
number of exonerees petition for awards.62  Second, opponents warn that 
undeserving individuals will recover.63  Both threats are unfounded. 
1. Cost 
 Even in states with inflated prison populations and a vast criminal 
justice system, the number of individuals who are not only innocent, but 
who have the means to establish their innocence is small and getting 
 
Determine Pay, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Apr. 16, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, 
U.S. Newspapers File; David White, Ex-Death Row Inmate Awaits Compensation, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, May 30, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, U.S. 
Newspapers File; David White, Wrongfully Jailed Favor Review Panel, BIRMINGHAM 
NEWS, Apr. 10, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, U.S. Newspapers File. 
 58. ALA. CODE § 29-2-159 (2003). 
 59. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(E)(2)(b)-(d) (Anderson 2000). 
 60. See Burden of Innocence:  A Special Series from the Plain Dealer, at 
http://www.cleveland.com/burden (last visited Apr. 22, 2004) (providing links to the 
articles in the series).  “‘The Burden of Innocence’ was a five-day series about Michael 
Green, who was falsely convicted of rape.  After the series was published, another man, 
Rodney Rhines, came forward and confessed to the 1989 crime.  Rhines subsequently 
was convicted and is now in prison.”  Series Earns Citations, PD Staffers Win Awards, 
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Mar. 8, 2003, at B1. 
 61. Interview with Ann Lambert, Legislative Counsel, ACLU of Mass. (Jan. 
2004); Interview with Sharon Bivens, Alabama Legislative Fiscal Office (Aug. & Sept. 
2000). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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smaller.64  Most postconviction exonerations have been won through DNA 
testing,65  and even a quick look at a “typical” DNA case reveals why the 
numbers of exonerations will decrease.  In each DNA exoneration, the 
actual perpetrator of the crime left DNA, in some form, at the scene of the 
crime.66  In order to impact the verdict postconviction, the DNA must 
survive to be retested years later. 67 
 The “typical” DNA exoneration is a rape case, in which the rapist 
ejaculates in or around the victim and leaves the scene.  The victim reports 
the rape, is examined by a doctor, and a rape kit is prepared.  The kit 
 
 64. Most exonerations have occurred in Illinois, where there have been 
twenty-three. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, CASE PROFILES, at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/search_profiles.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2004) 
[hereinafter INNOCENCE PROJECT, CASE PROFILES], for the stories of the twenty-three 
Illinois exonerees.  New York has had fourteen, and Texas and Virginia have had 
thirteen.  Id.  After that, the number of exonerations in each state drops dramatically:  
Oklahoma (8); Massachusetts (9); Pennsylvania (6); California (6); West Virginia (6); 
Indiana (4); Michigan and Ohio (4).  Id.  The remaining states have had only one, two, 
or three exonerations. 
 65. INNOCENCE PROJECT, CAUSES AND REMEDIES OF WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS, at http://www.innocenceproject.org.  Of course, innocent people have 
been exonerated without DNA evidence.  See generally EDWIN BORCHARD, 
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY 
(1957); MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE (1992).  Witnesses 
recant.  Actual perpetrators confess.  Undisclosed exculpatory material so substantially 
undercuts the reliability of the conviction that courts feel compelled to vacate 
convictions.  Many of the mid-1980s child sex abuse convictions have been reversed as 
courts and the public have learned to mistrust the testimony of young children and of 
self-styled child sex abuse therapists.  See generally RICHARD OFSHE & ETHAN 
WATTERS, MAKING MONSTERS:  FALSE MEMORIES, PSYCHOTHERAPY, AND SEXUAL 
HYSTERIA (1994); Dorothy Rabinowitz, Reckoning in Wenatchee, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 
1999, at A26 (documenting myriad reversals of trial court convictions stemming from 
townwide accusations by two child witnesses); Paul Craig Roberts, Saved by Pursuit of 
the Truth, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2000, at A16 (discussing false allegations of child 
abuse).  However, the number of non-DNA exonerations will never be large because it 
is so difficult to reverse a conviction without absolute evidence of innocence. 
 66. DNA is found in serological material such as blood, semen, saliva, sweat, 
and other bodily fluids. 
 67. To overturn a verdict based on postconviction DNA testing, the DNA 
must also be “material” to the verdict.  In the “typical” scenario, when the real 
perpetrator left DNA in semen, the DNA is clearly material in that it directly affects 
the ultimate decision regarding guilt or innocence.   DNA might not be material, if, for 
example, there was semen found in a rape victim’s vagina, but the rape victim had 
testified that the rapist used a condom and explained the presence of semen as a result 
of her earlier consensual sexual activity with another person.  In such a case, the fact 
that the DNA in the semen failed to match the person convicted of the crime would be 
irrelevant. 
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preserves samples of the perpetrator’s semen.  The victim later identifies 
someone she believes is the perpetrator.  The accused is subsequently 
charged, and possibly convicted, based on that testimony.  The serological 
material contained in the rape kit may have been produced at trial to 
establish that a rape occurred, or to show that the perpetrator and the 
accused shared a common blood type.  No DNA testing would have been 
done because that procedure was not available at the time of the criminal 
investigation.  The accused is sentenced to prison.  Years later, when DNA 
testing becomes available, the rape kit is found, and the collected material 
is analyzed.  It shows that the convicted person is not the perpetrator.  This 
“typical” scenario is less likely to occur in the future than it has in the past, 
simply because DNA testing can now be accomplished during the 
investigatory stage of a case.68 
 Nevertheless, there are still individuals in prison waiting to establish 
their innocence through DNA testing.  Some are fighting to have tests 
conducted.  Tests cost money that must be raised.  Others are hoping to 
locate the crucial evidence.  Also, some recent convictions are newly 
subject to challenge as the result of ever improving technology.  The ability 
to conduct DNA testing on trace amounts of biological material—e.g., 
sweat clinging to clothing or saliva stuck to cigarettes—has improved,69 and 
minute amounts of DNA can now be grown to a sufficient size to make 
testing possible.70  Overall, however, the rate of DNA exonerations will 
inevitably slow.  The number of convicted inmates who can locate material, 
relevant, and untested forensic material will dwindle, as will the number of 
individuals claiming compensation for unjust conviction. 
 Furthermore, even in states with the greatest number of exonerations, 
the cost of compensating deserving individuals has been minimal.  In New 
 
 68. Naturally, there may be any number of innocent individuals in prison 
unable to win their freedom because rape kits or other physical evidence have been 
destroyed.  Moreover, most cases—e.g., robberies, thefts, or drug offenses—involve no 
testable material.  In those situations, innocent people are rarely able to establish their 
innocence. 
 69. BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE:  
FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 
67-69 (2000). 
 70. Id. at 36-40.  The polymerase chain reaction (PCR), invented by Kary 
Mullis in 1983, is a process by which certain chemicals are added to a single gene or 
fragment of DNA, causing the DNA to replicate itself exponentially so there is more of 
the substance to test.  Kary Mullis, The Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), at 
http://www.karymullis.com (last visited June 5, 2004).  As a result, even if only a tiny 
fragment of DNA is recovered, the PCR technique can be used to exonerate a 
defendant.  Id. 
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York State, for example, the court of claims has resolved 214 wrongful 
conviction claims since New York’s compensation statute was enacted in 
1984.71  Of that number, 154 cases were dismissed, and nineteen others 
were settled out of court.72  In only twelve cases did the court actually make 
an award, and then, for an average of just $457,000 per case.73 
2. Risk of Rewarding Individuals Responsible for Their Own Convictions 
 Despite our national rhetoric, generally anyone arrested and accused 
of a serious crime is presumed to be guilty.74  Once a police investigation 
focuses on a suspect, that person is never again viewed without suspicion.  
Acquittals are not equivalent to a declaration of innocence.75  An acquittal 
means only that the prosecution failed to meet its burden.  Persons who 
have served time in prison convicted of crimes they did not commit report 
that the communities into which they are released view them with disbelief 
or even fear, despite their well-publicized exoneration.76 
 Bias against those who have been accused and reluctance to accept 
the possibility of mistake color prosecutorial attitudes toward 
compensation legislation.  Even when DNA evidence clearly exonerates, 
prosecutors have trouble admitting that they convicted the wrong person.77 
 
 71. Stephen, supra note 53, at A23. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 334 
(1995) (citing to a number of scholarly works that document the pervasive presumption 
of guilt following arrest). 
 75. Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions:  Do We 
Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1323 (1997) (citing United 
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984)). 
 76. I have experienced this phenomenon myself.  I represent Dennis 
Halstead, who, along with his codefendants, John Restivo and John Kogut, was 
released from prison in July 2003 after serving almost eighteen years in prison, when 
the Nassau County District Attorney agreed to vacate his conviction. The charges 
against Mr. Halstead and his codefendants are still pending, despite DNA evidence 
establishing their innocence.  While waiting for one of the court proceedings, I 
overheard the judge’s secretary express fear because one of the defendants was moving 
to his mother’s home, which was located down the block from where the secretary’s 
mother lives.  For other examples, see SCHECK ET AL., supra note 69, at 223-38. 
 77. See generally Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal:  Prosecutorial Resistance 
to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2004).  In case after case, 
even after DNA testing establishes that the convicted person could not have been the 
perpetrator, normally logical prosecutors will spin increasingly implausible 
explanations for the presence of the exculpatory material.  For example, in the Darryl 
Hunt case, the prosecutor argued in summation that Mr. Hunt had raped the victim, 
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 On the other hand, it is legitimate to guard against recovery by 
individuals whose behavior impeded the “truth-seeking” function of a 
police investigation, just as the doctrine of comparative negligence works 
to limit damage awards for those who are partially responsible for their 
own injury.78  Unfortunately, the vague and inchoate suspicion of anyone 
who has been arrested, prosecuted, and convicted, even if falsely, tends to 
infect the drafting process so that the most frequent disqualifications are 
not logically related to legitimate concerns. 
 For example, lawmakers and lobbyists for prosecutors sometimes 
demand that compensation legislation exclude from possible recovery 
those individuals who have contributed to their own conviction.79  The two 
types of contributory behavior most frequently identified in a statute as 
disqualifications are confessions and guilty pleas.80  Neither should suffice, 
without more. 
a.  Confessions.     New York’s compensation statute precludes 
recovery for those who “by [their] own conduct cause or bring about [their] 
conviction.”81  That disqualification has been interpreted to bar persons 
who have given an uncoerced confession or plead guilty.  Drafters of New 
York’s statute82 explained that the disqualification was intended to require 
 
ejaculated inside her, and then stabbed her to death.  Phoebe Zerwick, State:  DNA 
Results Irrelevant; Scientific Evidence Shows Semen in Sykes Case Was Not That of 
Hunt or Other Possible Suspects, WINSTON-SALEM J., Nov. 22, 2003, available at 
http://darrylhunt.journalnow.com/stories/partseven/story/html.  When the DNA tests 
proved that Mr. Hunt had not been the rapist, the prosecutor argued—in complete 
contradiction to his previous statements—that Mr. Hunt must have restrained and 
stabbed the victim while someone else committed the rape.  Id.  Only when the police 
matched the DNA to another person—who immediately confessed to committing the 
crime on his own—did the prosecutor admit it was wrong to convict Mr. Hunt.  
Zerwick, supra note 53. 
 78. 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 799 (2004); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 463 (1965) (“Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff 
which falls below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection, and 
which is a legally contributing cause co-operating with the negligence of the defendant 
in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm.”). 
 79. Interview with Ann Lambert, supra note 61. 
 80. See generally Adele Bernhard, Table, When Justice Fails:  Indemnification 
of Unjust Conviction, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 345 (2000) (summarizing the 
various statutes). 
 81. See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(4)(b), (5)(d) (McKinney 1989). 
 82. In the early 1980s, New York Governor Mario Cuomo appointed legal 
scholars, jurists, and practitioners to a Law Revision Commission that would consider 
how and when to compensate individuals who had been unjustly convicted and later 
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that 
the person seeking damages . . . [must ] establish that he did not cause 
or bring about his prosecution by reason of his own misconduct.  
Examples of such misconduct would include falsely giving an 
uncoerced confession of guilt, removing evidence, attempting to 
induce a witness to give false testimony, attempting to suppress 
testimony, or concealing the guilt of another.83 
Of course, in 1984, when New York’s statute was enacted, no one 
believed in the phenomenon of false confessions.84  The idea of a false 
confession probably conjured the vision of a scoundrel sabotaging a police 
investigation to protect fellow mobsters.  Today, preventing individuals 
from benefiting from their own intentional misconduct, such as inducing 
others to give false testimony or hiding evidence, remains appropriate.85  
But it no longer seems rational to consider all false confessions as 
misconduct, because multiple exonerations prove that innocent people 
falsely implicate themselves,86 despite gaining nothing for themselves in the 
process.87  Social scientists have ideas about why individuals falsely confess, 
 
exonerated.  N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM’N, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION 
COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR ON REDRESS FOR INNOCENT PERSONS UNJUSTLY 
CONVICTED AND SUBSEQUENTLY IMPRISONED, 1984 N.Y. Laws 2899. 
 83. Id.  at 2932. 
 84. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problems of False Confessions in 
the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 910 (2004) (discussing the contemporary 
phenomenon of false confessions and acknowledging that “most people do not appear 
to know that interrogation-induced false confessions even exist”). 
 85. Courts have dismissed claims for compensation when the claimant was 
convicted after instructing his attorney not to let the defendant’s wife testify, 
presumably because she was involved in the crime or because she had incriminating 
testimony, e.g., Taylor v. State, 605 N.Y.S.2d 172, 174 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d sub nom. 
Williams v. State, 661 N.E.2d 1381, 1382 (N.Y. 1995), or when the claimant was not 
guilty of the crime charged (scheme to defraud), but was guilty of larceny on the same 
set of facts, e.g., Rogers v. State, 694 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878 (Ct. Cl. 1999), or when the 
claimant knew the crime was committed by his twin brother, but refused to name him 
and was convicted as a result, e.g., Stevenson v. State, 520 N.Y.S.2d 492, 494 (Ct. Cl. 
1987), or when the claimant was convicted after proffering a false alibi, e.g., Moses v. 
State, 523 N.Y.S.2d 761, 764 (Ct. Cl. 1987). 
 86. Patricia Smith, Brenton Butler Didn’t Do It, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT, Sept. 
1, 2003, at 8, 8. 
 87. Of the first 123 exonerations that the Innocence Project assisted, as of 
March 4, 2004, thirty-three involved false confessions.  INNOCENCE PROJECT, CASE 
PROFILES, supra note 64.  See generally Drizin & Leo, supra note 84; Richard A. Leo & 
Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:  Deprivations of Liberty and 
Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
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but they do not understand all the dynamics involved.88  New York’s 
statute should be amended to make clear that no category of persons will 
be automatically excluded from recovery and that the circumstances of 
each case will be individually considered. 
False confessions can be either uncoerced or coerced.  An uncoerced 
false confession occurs when an individual, on his or her own independent 
volition, perhaps driven by some personal psychological compulsion, 
confesses to a crime he or she did not commit.89  An uncoerced false 
confession could also result from an attempt to manipulate a police 
investigation for some illegitimate purpose, such as protecting someone 
else from investigation. 
A coerced false confession generally results from police 
interrogation.90  The same techniques that can induce true confessions can 
cause false confessions.  Often police are eager to solve a crime, convinced 
that they have focused on the correct culprit, and aware that an admission 
will help convince the prosecutor to charge the suspect.  They may, 
consciously or unconsciously, feed the target details of the crime so that the 
resulting admission is convincingly accurate.91   In the next few years, as 
 
CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998). 
 88. Leo & Ofshe, supra note 87, at 431. 
 89. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 160-67 (1986) (describing the 
defendant’s confession as uncoerced when the defendant approached an off-duty 
police officer and told the officer of his need to confess because his conscience was 
troubling him). 
 90. See, e.g., INNOCENCE PROJECT, BRUCE GODSCHALK, at 
http://www.innocence project.org/case/search_profiles.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2004) 
(discussing the coerced confession of Bruce Godschalk). 
 91.  
Police-induced false confessions arise when a suspect’s resistance to confession 
is broken down as a result of poor police practice, overzealousness, criminal 
misconduct and/or misdirected training.  Interrogators sometimes become so 
committed to closing a case that they improperly use psychological 
interrogation techniques to coerce or persuade a suspect into giving a 
statement that allows the interrogator to make an arrest.  Sometimes police 
become so certain of the suspect’s guilt that they refuse to even-handedly 
evaluate new evidence or to consider the possibility that a suspect may be 
innocent, even when all the case evidence has been gathered and 
overwhelmingly demonstrates that the confession is false.  Once a confession is 
obtained, investigation often ceases, and convicting the defendant becomes the 
only goal of both investigators and prosecutors. . . . 
American police are poorly trained about the dangers of interrogation and 
false confession.  Rarely are police officers instructed in how to avoid eliciting 
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more police precincts videotape interrogations, we will better understand 
how and why individuals falsely confess.92 
In the meantime, multiple exonerations have educated the public 
about confessions.  We no longer automatically accept as true a confession 
that results from long hours of interrogation, false promises, and pressure 
tactics, and we certainly do not hold innocent individuals who have been 
coerced into falsely confessing responsible for their own convictions.  The 
fact that a young, mentally challenged, chemically dependant, submissive, 
or just plain scared individual succumbs to police interrogation techniques 
and confesses to a crime that he or she did not commit no longer seems like 
misconduct that should prevent recovery years later when the truth finally 
surfaces.  Statutes should be amended to more accurately reflect current 
social science. 
The mere existence of an inculpatory statement or a confession 
should never defeat a claim.  Only an uncoerced false confession 
specifically intended to distort the truth-seeking function of the police 
investigation should prevent recovery.  In determining whether a 
confession was the product of coercion, courts should presume all false 
confessions to be the product of coercion unless they can be shown 
otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.  Moreover, the results of a 
pretrial ruling on the admissibility of the confession should be irrelevant.93  
 
confessions, how to understand what causes false confessions, or how to 
recognize the forms false confessions take or their distinguishing 
characteristics.  Instead, some interrogation manual writers and trainers persist 
in the unfounded belief that contemporary psychological methods will not 
cause the innocent to confess—a fiction so thoroughly contradicted by all of 
the research on police interrogation that it can be labeled a potentially deadly 
myth.  This fiction perpetuates the commonly held belief that only torture can 
cause an innocent suspect to confess, and it allows some police to rationalize 
accepting coerced and demonstrably unreliable confession statements as true. 
Leo & Ofshe, supra note 87, at 440-44 (footnotes omitted). 
 92.  
Only four states and the city of Washington have decided to require 
recorded interrogations . . . .  The Center on Wrongful Convictions at 
Northwestern University recently surveyed 238 law enforcement agencies 
around the country that currently record the questioning of felony suspects.  It 
found that “virtually every officer with whom we spoke, having given custodial 
recordings a try, was enthusiastically in favor of the practice.” 
Editorial, Recording Police Questioning, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2004, at A22, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, N.Y. Times File; see supra note 23. 
 93. See, e.g., Dodrill v. Ludt, 764 F.2d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he general 
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The standard applied to determine admissibility at trial is whether the 
statement was “voluntarily made.”94  In determining voluntariness, coercive 
techniques are not necessarily determinative.95  As a result, although police 
interrogation techniques may create false confessions, they do not always 
render confessions “involuntary” as a matter of law or inadmissible at 
trial.96  Thus, in the end, veracity is not a factor in the determination of 
admissibility,97 and consequently, a pretrial ruling on admissibility should 
play no role in deciding whether to award compensation. 
b.  Other Disqualifications:  Guilty Pleas and Prior Convictions.     
Guilty pleas should not be an automatic bar to recovery.  Although most 
unjustly convicted individuals chose to go to trial, a number have pled 
guilty.98  Sometimes, individuals plead guilty at the insistence of counsel, 
who may doubt their innocence and fear the worst outcome after trial.  
Whether the plea was caused by the accused’s inability to understand or 
assess his rights and predicament, or whether the plea was compelled by 
counsel’s ineffectiveness, it should not act as a disqualification.  Once 
again, if it were determined that the plea was entered to intentionally 
manipulate an ongoing investigation or to protect another from being 
charged with the crime, that activity could act as a disqualification.  But, 
without evidence of illegitimate motive, when an innocent person pleads 
guilty to a crime he or she did not commit, the plea is neither symptomatic 
of unworthy behavior nor proof of complicity in the crime.  Thus, any 
rationale for using it as a disqualification falls away. 
 Finally, no claimant should be precluded from compensation because 
of a prior felony conviction.  Damages, of course, can be adjusted, so that a 
 
rule is that a judgment which is vacated, for whatever reason, is deprived of its 
conclusive effect as collateral estoppel.”). 
 94. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 303 (1991) (“The 
admissibility of a confession . . . depends on whether it was voluntarily made.”). 
 95. For example, in New York State, while physical threats will render a 
resulting “confession” inadmissible, People v. Gaddy, 523 N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (App. Div. 
1987), false promises will not, People v. Richardson, 609 N.Y.S.2d 981, 982 (App. Div. 
1994). 
 96. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 n.2 (1986) (“Even when 
there is a causal connection between police misconduct and the defendant’s confession, 
it does not automatically follow that there has been a violation of the Due Process 
Clause.”) (citing Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969)).  Furthermore, the Court in 
Connelly held that a confession’s lack of reliability “is a matter to be governed by the 
evidentiary laws of the forum . . . and not by the Due Process Clause . . . .”  Id. at 167. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, CASE PROFILES, supra note 64. 
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person with a criminal record might recover less.  Courts can award 
damages according to the same equitable principles that guide the 
assessment of damages in more routine personal injury actions.99  The 
difficulty of putting a price tag on freedom or loss of opportunity does not 
mean that courts are inept at the task.100 
III. LITIGATION 
 Litigation is difficult, time-consuming, and expensive—even when 
plaintiffs assert conventional and well-accepted legal claims.101   When a 
plaintiff seeks vindication for a new category of harm or for a harm that 
was previously unrecognized, such as wrongful conviction, that plaintiff 
must formulate new legal strategies.  Such creative litigation is challenging 
indeed. 
A.  Preliminary Considerations 
1. Actionable Conduct102 
 Some wrongful convictions result from unfortunate, but inevitable 
accidents for which no individual or entity can be blamed.  Let us say that a 
rape victim, shaky and understandably scared of all strange men, believes 
that she glimpses her assailant standing on a dimly lit street corner near her 
home.  She calls the police and identifies the man she spots as the rapist.  
On the basis of that information, the police have probable cause to 
arrest.103  If the accused has no alibi, and there is no reason to doubt the 
 
 99. New York decisions provide plenty of examples of  judges wrestling with 
the value of years lost and opportunities stolen.  See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 558 
N.Y.S.2d 722, 725 (Ct. Cl. 1992) (awarding only $40,000 for wrongful conviction in light 
of the claimant’s prior criminal record and numerous incarcerations). 
 100. See id. 
 101. Plaintiffs navigate legal minefields to recover damages when police and 
prosecutors (and the cities, counties, and municipalities that hire, train, and supervise 
them) cause harm, even when the harm consists of such routine abuses of power as:  
excessive force, warrantless search, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. See 
generally MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT:  LAW AND LITIGATION § 2:1 
(3d ed. 1999); SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION:  
THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (4th ed. 2003). 
 102. The titles of the sub-sub-headings under the sub-heading Preliminary 
Considerations are borrowed from chapter titles in AVERY ET AL., supra note 101. 
 103. Generally, a finding of probable cause precludes a determination of 
malicious prosecution.  E.g., Wasilewicz v. Vill. of Monroe Police Dep’t, 771 N.Y.S.2d 
170, 171 (App. Div. 2004) (citing Gisondi v. Town of Harrison, 528 N.E.2d 157 (N.Y. 
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victim’s sanity or powers of observation, her accusation will undoubtedly 
evolve into a prosecution.  The accused may easily be convicted, even 
though innocent, because of the persuasiveness of the victim’s false 
identification.104  In such a case, built primarily on the victim’s 
identification and with very little police or prosecutorial involvement, there 
would be no cause of action against the police, prosecution, or victim. 
2. Individual, Supervisory, and Local Governmental Liability 
 Even in those cases in which it is possible to attribute the wrongful 
conviction to law enforcement behavior, immunity doctrine protects most 
participants in the criminal justice system from liability for damages.  For 
starters, a state cannot be sued for damages under § 1983 in either state or 
federal court—unless the state has waived its immunity and subjected itself 
to suit.105  Thus, if state employees’ activities resulted in a wrongful 
conviction, the state itself could not be sued; plaintiffs could proceed only 
 
1988); Kandekore v. Town of Greenburgh, 663 N.Y.S.2d 274 (App. Div. 1997)).  This 
Article does not discuss litigation in those circumstances when an arrest was made 
without probable cause, which might give rise to a state law claim for false arrest or 
malicious prosecution.  Further, 
[w]hen a defendant is arrested and jailed on the basis of probable cause to 
believe that he has committed a crime, and only later does police fraud enter 
the 
picture with the effect of perpetuating the seizure without good cause, there is 
a 
question not as yet authoritatively resolved whether the Fourth Amendment 
has 
been violated. 
Gauger v. Hendle, 349 F.3d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 104. When forced to choose between a victim’s identification testimony and an 
accused’s alibi evidence, juries have believed eyewitnesses and convicted, despite the 
heavy burden on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., 
People v. Daniels, 453 N.Y.S.2d 699, 702 (App. Div. 1982) (reversing a conviction in a 
case in which a jury believed an eyewitness identification over the defendant’s alibi 
evidence). 
 105. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16, 19-20 (1890) (“The suability of a state, 
without its consent, [is] a thing unknown to the law.  This has been so often laid down 
and acknowledged by courts and jurists that it is hardly necessary to be formally 
asserted.”).   Sometimes it is difficult to know whether a particular governmental 
official is protected by the doctrine of state sovereign immunity.  See, e.g., McMillian v. 
Monroe, 520 U.S. 781, 793 (1997) (holding that a county sheriff represents the state, 
not the county); Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that a city prosecutor was acting as a state employee); Scott v. O’Grady, 975 
F.2d 366, 370 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that a county sheriff was a state employee working 
pursuant to a state court order). 
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against individual actors who, more often than not, lack “deep pockets.” 
 Cities and other municipal entities are not protected by state 
immunity and can be sued under § 1983 for the activities of their 
employees, but only if those activities were both unconstitutional and 
performed in accordance with the “custom” or “policy” of the 
municipality.106  In other words, if a police officer’s unconstitutional acts 
were not authorized or sanctioned by the entity that employs him or her, 
the officer might be personally liable under § 1983, but the entity would not 
be.107  Should the officer’s unconstitutional behavior be proven to be 
consistent with the rules of his department, his training, or the instructions 
of a municipal policymaker,108 the municipality might be liable for the 
activities.109 
3. Absolute and Qualified Immunity 
 Doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity protect individual 
officials.110  Absolute immunity is a status immunity that protects 
prosecutors from suit for decisions made and actions taken “initiating a 
prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.”111  Judges are protected by 
 
 106. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 
 107. If the plaintiff is limited to recovering against an individual officer or two, 
the value of the claim is substantially reduced, because the officer might be judgment 
proof, and the employing entity might refuse to indemnify the officer. 
 108. A municipality may be liable for failure to train or supervise prosecutors 
to ensure that they meet their constitutional obligation to turn over exculpatory 
material to the defense.  Ricciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 
1997) (reversing summary judgment on a claim of failure to adequately train); Walker 
v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the city could be 
liable for failure to train and supervise prosecutors on their obligation to disclose 
exculpatory evidence); Johnson v. Kings County Dist. Attorney’s Office, 763 N.Y.S.2d 
635, 649 (App. Div. 2003) (holding that a citizen might recover compensatory, but not 
punitive, damages from the city under a theory of willful failure to train or supervise 
employees). 
 109. Pembar v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986). 
 110. See, e.g., Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Although § 
1983 does not expressly provide a defense of official immunity, our courts have 
repeatedly recognized that absolute and qualified immunity shield certain types of 
official conduct from § 1983 actions.”) (citing Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125-26 
(1997); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 
409, 417 (1976)). 
 111. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 431.  Activities prosecutors undertake as 
investigators, including taking statements at the scene of a crime or directing the police 
investigation, enjoy only qualified immunity. 
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absolute immunity for the work that they do in their official capacity.112  
Testifying witnesses are protected as well.113 
 Police officers, however, have only “qualified immunity.”114  
Providing the police with less immunity makes sense because the police 
play the largest role in shaping an investigation.  Police arrange lineups 
through which identifications are made.  They take statements, which form 
powerful evidence at trial.  They interview or fail to interview witnesses.  
They collect or fail to preserve evidence. 
 On the other hand, many mistakes police make in the course of a 
criminal investigation are immunized if it was objectively reasonable for 
the officers to have believed, even incorrectly, that their behavior was 
lawful.115  Because police are active decisionmakers and because judicial 
interpretation of the law is in constant flux, courts protect police officers 
from having to “predict[] the future course of constitutional law”116 and 
encourage them to err on the side of active, vigorous enforcement.117 
 In making determinations about liability, courts distinguish between 
negligent failure to investigate and a reckless or intentional failure.118  They 
consider such factors as:  urgency, the quantum of existing evidence, the 
 
 112. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). 
 113. Complainants and witnesses are protected from liability unless the 
prosecution is baseless and the complaint is made with malice.  See generally Anthony 
v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir. 1992); White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1988); 
Nardelli v. Stanberg, 377 N.E.2d 975 (1978). 
 114. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 (1986) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 
at 557). 
 115. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). 
 116. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 557. 
 117. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (stating that qualified 
immunity “encourag[es] the vigorous exercise of official authority”). 
 118.  See AVERY ET AL., supra note 101, at 2-27.  Compare Wilson v. Lawrence 
County, 260 F.3d 946, 952-53 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that officers’ were not entitled to 
qualified immunity when the defendant’s confession was coerced and involuntary), and 
BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 128-29 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that officer should have 
made further inquiry of witnesses at the time of arrest, which might have discredited 
the basis for the arrest in a child neglect case), with Schertz v. Waupaca County, 875 
F.2d 578, 583 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that once police officers have probable cause, 
they have no constitutional obligation to conduct any further investigation in the hopes 
of uncovering potentially exculpatory evidence), and Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 
1477-78 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that the police were not liable for the failure to 
investigate the accused’s alibi witnesses), and Simmons v. McElveen, 846 F.2d 337, 339 
(5th Cir. 1988) (finding police not liable for their failure to compare fingerprints left on 
a cigarette box dropped by the assailant with prints of the accused). 
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difficulty of continuing the investigation, and the seriousness of the charges 
in making that determination. 
 Nonetheless, police are not shielded from liability for all conduct.  
They are not protected if their conduct violates “clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”119  Naturally, there has been litigation over the definition of a 
“clearly established” constitutional right,120 and whether claimants are 
required to prove that the police acted “bad faith” when they violated the 
right.121  In resolving civil rights claims, courts resolve immunity questions 
first.122  If a court determines that a plaintiff has not alleged a violation of a 
clearly established right, the court will not address whether the proof is 
sufficient to establish the violation.123 
Judicial reluctance to interfere with the specifics of police work will 
further erode.  Exonerations force courts to take a less deferential look at 
policing. 
B.  New Theories to Vindicate the Unjustly Convicted 
 In the next section, I look at a half-dozen recent cases in which 
lawyers have used creative strategies to recover damages for individuals 
wrongly accused, tried, and, in some cases, convicted.  I have not limited 
the discussion to cases in which plaintiffs were convicted and subsequently 
exonerated, because some strategies used by those who were wrongly 
accused but acquitted are equally applicable to suits on behalf of 
exonerees.  I do not purport to capture every imaginative use of federal 
civil rights laws to vindicate those who have been wrongfully convicted, nor 
do I analyze all the issues in great depth.  Finally, because state law claims 
are state-specific and variable, I do not explore or even inventory them.  I 
intend to provide an introduction to a complex and evolving subject and to 
 
 119. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 
475 U.S. at 341 (discussing the Harlow standard in denying an officer’s claim of 
immunity). 
 120. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) (stating that for a legal 
rule to be “clearly established,” there must be controlling precedent). 
 121. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (holding that a 
plaintiff need not allege bad faith in a case against an official with qualified immunity). 
 122. See, e.g., Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d at 1475-77 (ascertaining first whether the 
plaintiff “sufficiently asserted the violation of a constitutional right” and answering any 
other qualified immunity questions before addressing the merits). 
 123. See, e.g., Home v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding 
qualified immunity and therefore not reaching the merits). 
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encourage more litigation. 
1. Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence 
 In a criminal prosecution, the state must disclose to the defense all 
exculpatory or helpful evidence124 that is material to the prosecution.125  
Police have an affirmative duty to disclose such material to the 
prosecution,126 and the prosecution must in turn reveal it to the defense.127 
 Brady material can take many shapes and forms, including:  a prior 
criminal record, psychiatric history, or other information relevant to 
witness credibility,128 failure to make an identification of the accused,129 
identification of someone other than the accused,130 information suggesting 
that someone other than the accused is the perpetrator,131 cooperation 
agreements with witnesses,132 or a witness’s prior inconsistent statement.133  
Not surprisingly, the failure to disclose exculpatory material and 
impeachment material to the defense has contributed to a substantial 
number of wrongful convictions.134 
 If a convicted defendant locates Brady material that was not 
disclosed, that person can attack the conviction and bring a motion for a 
new trial.135  If the undisclosed evidence was material and likely to have 
changed the outcome of the trial, the conviction will be reversed, and a new 
 
 124. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that information is 
exculpatory if it is “favorable to the accused” either because it would “tend to 
exculpate him” or because it undermines the credibility of a material witness). 
 125. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-36 (1995) (holding that evidence is 
material if it undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial). 
 126. Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 127. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 128. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972). 
 129. People v. Davis, 614 N.E.2d 719, 722 (N.Y. 1993). 
 130. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (“Impeachment 
evidence . . . falls within the Brady rule.”) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. at 
154). 
 131. See id. (“[E]xculpatory evidence . . . falls within the Brady rule.”) (citing 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. at 154). 
 132. People v. Steadman, 623 N.E.2d 509, 512 (N.Y. 1993). 
 133. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 (“Impeachment evidence . . . 
falls within the Brady rule.”) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. at 154). 
 134. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, CASE PROFILES, supra note 64. 
 135. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. at 154 (“A new trial is required if 
‘the false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment 
of the jury . . . .’”) (quoting Naupe v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959)) (alterations in 
original). 
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trial will be ordered.136 
Once the criminal case has been resolved, either by acquittal after the 
retrial or dismissal, the exonerated person might be able to use the Brady 
violation as the basis for a civil rights lawsuit.137  The exoneree would argue 
that the failure to disclose evidence that substantially undercut the police 
case against the accused or that clearly pointed to the accused’s innocence 
was a violation of the suspect’s constitutional due process rights; such 
violations are actionable under § 1983 if there is a loss of liberty as a result 
of the violation.138  Because prosecutors are absolutely immune for even an 
intentional concealment of Brady material,139 the only way an exonerated 
plaintiff could recover would be to establish the police had the exculpatory 
or impeachment material and failed to turn it over to the prosecution. 
Many questions and difficulties arise.  Plaintiffs must establish that 
the harm suffered—the conviction and time in jail—resulted directly from 
the constitutional violation.140  Plaintiffs must further show that the 
undisclosed material was Brady material, i.e., that it was either exculpatory 
or valuable for its impeachment potential. 
The reversal of a highly publicized child sexual assault case gave the 
New York Appellate Division, First Department, an opportunity to rule 
that a city agency’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the district 
attorney and the district attorney’s failure to search for, gather, and 
disclose that material to the defense constitutes a violation of the plaintiff’s 
civil rights.141  Mr. Ramos was convicted and sentenced to prison for the 
 
 136. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 677 (citing Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. at 154). 
 137. See Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(addressing a case in which an exonerated person brought action against the City of 
New York under § 1983). 
 138. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003) (stating every person who, acting under color 
of state law, subjects another to the deprivation of rights under the Constitution shall 
be liable for injuries). 
 139. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (discussing absolute 
immunity for prosecutors under § 1983). 
 140. See, e.g., Jones v. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 702 F.2d 203, 207 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(stating that a § 1983 plaintiff is entitled “to compensation [only] for actual harm 
resulting directly” from the violation of federal rights) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 
247, 260 & n.15 (1978); Vanelli v. Reynolds Sch. Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 
1982)). 
 141. Ramos v. City of New York, 729 N.Y.S.2d 678, 692-95 (App. Div. 2001), 
aff’d, 762 N.Y.S.2d 807 (App. Div. 2003). 
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sexual abuse of a small child.142  When accused, Mr. Ramos was a college 
student, working part time as a teacher’s aide.143  The Human Resources 
Administration (HRA) conducted the investigation into the accusation.144  
The child was examined physically and psychologically, and experts 
determined that the child had been abused.145 
HRA investigators knew that the child had a history of strangely 
inappropriate sexual behavior and had made other false complaints.146  For 
some reason, HRA was slow to release the material to the prosecution, and 
the assistant district attorney assigned to the trial failed to inform the 
defense about the material.147  As a result, Mr. Ramos served almost a 
decade in prison convicted by the testimony of the youngster, doctors, and 
social worker “validators” who believed that abuse had occurred.148  
During discovery in a civil case brought by the child and her mother against 
the day care center for failure to protect the child, the previously 
undisclosed reports surfaced.149  Mr. Ramos brought a motion to set aside 
his conviction.150  After the conviction was vacated as a result of the Brady 
violation and the indictment was dismissed, Mr. Ramos sued for damages 
in state court.151  He asserted against the investigating agency, HRA, the 
tort of malicious prosecution, on the theory that the Brady information 
would have erased any probable cause justifying his arrest and 
prosecution.152  He charged the city under § 1983 with violating his due 
process right to a fair trial by permitting the assistant district attorney to 
ignore her duty to disclose Brady material.153 
On appeal from the trial court decision denying the city’s request for 
summary judgment, the First Department held the Brady violation 
actionable under § 1983.154  The court found that a valid state law malicious 
prosecution claim was asserted against the city for HRA’s selectively 
 
 142. Id. at 685. 
 143. Id. at 682. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 683. 
 146. Id. at 682-83. 
 147. Id. at 683-84. 
 148. See id. at 685 (noting that judgment was rendered on June 12, 1985 and 
that Ramos was released on June 2, 1992). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 685-86. 
 152. Id. at 686. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 692. 
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reported misleading information and intentional withholding of material 
and relevant exculpatory information.155   The court also found New York 
City responsible under § 1983 for the local district attorney’s failure to 
institute adequate policies and to ensure that assistant district attorneys 
recognize and act on their responsibilities to search for, collect, and 
disclose Brady material.156  The court found that when a municipal 
employee acts in violation of a person’s federal civil rights, pursuant to 
municipal policy or custom, then it is the municipality that acts improperly, 
even if the individual employee is immune.157  The suit was eventually 
settled for five million dollars to compensate for the seven years spent in 
jail.158 
 Very strong facts facilitated the Appellate Division’s decision.  
Discovery established that the Office of the Bronx District Attorney 
routinely ignored the Brady rights of accused persons.  The district 
attorney who tried the case against Mr. Ramos testified that her decision 
not to disclose the exculpatory materials was made in conformity with her 
training.159   That testimony could have convinced a jury that office policy 
and training led her to withhold the information that should have been 
disclosed.160  Particularly convincing were facts that no prosecutor in the 
office had ever been disciplined for failure to disclose Brady material and 
that ten other cases had been reversed for Brady violations.161 
 Similar issues arose in Carroccia v. Anderson.162  After being tried and 
acquitted in criminal court, John Carroccia brought an action complaining 
that the police had violated his due process right to a fair trial by failing to 
inform the prosecution of exculpatory evidence discovered during the 
 
 155. Id. at 689. 
 156. Id. at 692-93. 
 157. Id. at 692 (citing Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 
1992)).  “When a District Attorney evinces a pattern of ignoring law enforcement 
improprieties and misconduct, or fails to train and supervise ADA’s regarding Brady 
and other legal obligations, such management failures correlate with defects in the 
District Attorney’s role as a local policymaker.”  Id. at 693 (citations omitted).  Thus, 
“where prosecutors, pursuant to policy or custom, conceal exculpatory evidence,” they 
are county employees, not state employees.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 158. Sean Gardiner, $5 Million Cannot Undo 7 Years:  City Settles over Wrong 
Conviction, NEWSDAY (New York, N.Y.), Dec. 17, 2003, available at 
http://injusticebusters.com/2003/Ramos_Albert.htm. 
 159. Ramos v. City of New York, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 695. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Carroccia v. Anderson, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
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course of the investigation.163  The police knew that the wife of the man 
Carroccia was accused of killing had a “flawed alibi.”164  They knew she did 
not have a “normal reaction upon hearing of her husband’s murder,” and 
they knew she “possessed firearms, which she claimed to have used.”165  
While the police might not have been civilly liable for their failure to 
conduct a thorough investigation, or for focusing on a single suspect too 
early in the investigation, the court permitted the due process claim under 
§ 1983 on the theory that the “‘officers withheld information or evidence 
necessary for the fair and impartial trial guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution . . . .’”166  In other words, the court did not hold the police 
liable for failure to act upon the receipt of new information, but held them 
liable for their failure to tell the prosecutors about the new information so 
that the prosecutors could have evaluated the case in light of all the 
developments, and perhaps dismissed the case, sparing the plaintiff the 
humiliation and anxiety of a trial.167 
2. Failure to Accurately Describe Investigation as a Brady Violation 
The failure of the police to accurately describe an interrogation or 
identification procedure can be a violation of the Brady doctrine.168  Thus, 
when police shape evidence and conceal that activity from the prosecution, 
they violate the defendant’s due process rights.169  For example, if the 
police stage an identification procedure geared to ensure identification of 
the person they believe to be guilty, and then fail to accurately describe the 
rigged procedure so that the prosecution can independently evaluate the 
 
 163. Id. at 1020. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1023 (quoting Ienco v. City of Chicago, 286 F.3d 994, 999 (7th Cir. 
2002)).  It was irrelevant that Carroccia was acquitted at trial.  A favorable outcome 
does not render the trial fair, or neutralize police failure to comply with Brady 
obligations.  Id. 
 167. Id. at 1023-24. 
 168. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the 
prosecution’s failure to disclose favorable evidence to the defendant “violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment”). 
 169. See Manning v. Miller, 355 F.3d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that 
the defendant had a viable Brady claim because investigators created false evidence); 
Ienco v. City of Chicago, 286 F.3d at 1000 (“Neither the withholding of exculpatory 
information nor the initiation of constitutionally infirm criminal proceedings is 
protected by absolute immunity.”); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 989, 994, 995 
(7th Cir. 1988) (condemning police for concealing the weakness of the identification, 
evidence leading to other individuals, and lack of probable cause for arrest of accused). 
BERNHARD 5.2.DOC 8/24/2004  3:27:13 PM 
732 Drake Law Review [Vol. 52 
reliability of the resulting identification, the police have violated Brady. 
 That is exactly what happened in James Newsome’s case.  James 
Newsome was convicted of murdering Edward Cohen.170  During the 
investigation, two officers displayed photos to the identifying witnesses 
before the lineup “to improve the chance that [the witnesses] would pick 
Newsome.”171  The court held that the officers would not be entitled to 
qualified immunity if they induced the witnesses to falsely testify and then 
concealed their improper activities from the prosecution.172  Swayed by the 
importance placed on eyewitness testimony by jurors and by recent studies 
showing how easily such testimony can be manipulated, the court found 
that the manipulation of the identifications “would not by itself support an 
award of damages,” but “obstruct[ing] the ability of the prosecutors and 
defense counsel to get at the truth in the criminal trial” would support the 
jury’s award of damages,173 which in this case amounted to fifteen million 
dollars.174 
 Not all of the federal circuit courts are comfortable permitting civil 
rights suits for police failure to disclose exculpatory information.  For 
example, the Fourth Circuit requires plaintiffs to establish bad faith on the 
part of the police—at least when plaintiff’s proof of innocence (and thus 
injury and entitlement to damages) is equivocal, and when the asserted 
police misconduct is overshadowed by the prosecutorial misconduct that is 
protected by immunity.175  In 1982, Lesly Jean was arrested and convicted 
of sexual assault.176  During the investigation, a police officer and the victim 
were hypnotized to help them recall more details about the perpetrator’s 
appearance.177  Their descriptions changed as the result of the hypnotism 
and various suggestions made by the investigating officers.178  The full 
picture of how the investigation proceeded and the extent of the hypnotic 
influence on the witnesses was not disclosed to the defense in a timely 
 
 170. Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 302 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 171. Id. at 303. 
 172. Id. at 302. 
 173. Id. at 304 (referring to discussion in Newsome v. McCabe, 260 F.3d 824, 
824 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
 174. Id. at 303; Editorial, When Believing Isn’t Seeing, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30, 
2002, at 16. 
 175. Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656, 660-61 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 176. Jean v. Collins, 155 F.3d 701, 704 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc), vacated by 526 
U.S. 1142 (1999). 
 177. Id. at 703-04. 
 178. Id. at 704. 
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manner.179  As a result, Mr. Jean’s postconviction writ of habeas corpus was 
granted, and he was released from prison.180  The state did not retry his 
case.181  Neither innocence nor guilt was ever established.  Mr. Jean 
brought a § 1983 action asking for damages as a result of a due process 
violation.182 
 Although enough exculpatory material had been withheld to 
undercut the court’s confidence in the verdict, the court refused to impose 
liability on the police for the Brady violation, holding that the police are 
not liable for failure to transmit information to the prosecution unless they 
act in bad faith.183  The decision seems to have been prompted by a couple 
of factors. 
 First, as the court reviewed the facts, it was clear that some of the 
information relating to the hypnosis of the officer and victim had been 
disclosed to the prosecution and that the prosecution had kept it under 
wraps.184  The prosecutor stated that “the officers had ‘informed [him] of 
the existence of the hypnosis and identification procedures’” and that 
“‘there were some changes in [the witness’s] description after hypnosis’. . . 
.”185  Thus, the court stated that it would be unfair to blame the police—
who are only qualifiedly immune—when the prosecution was more at fault 
and also protected by absolute immunity.186  Further, the court was not 
convinced by plaintiff’s assertion that the police knew that they had failed 
to disclose all of the material in their possession, or understood that the 
material was exculpatory.187  Moreover, the court may have been 
influenced by the fact that Jean had not conclusively established his 
innocence. 
 In any event, the discussion could have ended with a determination 
that Jean had failed to make out his case, but it did not.  Analogizing to 
Arizona v. Youngblood,188 the Fourth Circuit held that, absent “bad faith,” 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 704-05. 
 181. Id. at 705. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656, 660-61 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 662. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (holding that there is no 
due process violation for failure to preserve potentially exculpatory material in absence 
of bad faith). 
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a Brady violation is not a constitutional violation actionable though § 
1983.189  The decision is misguided. 
The Fourth Circuit’s bad-faith requirement is unfairly protective of 
the police and sends the wrong message to law enforcement.  Holding the 
police accountable would have had the salutary effect of requiring police to 
accurately describe their investigation and ensuring that all details are 
transmitted to the prosecution.  In state criminal work, police conduct 
investigations on their own with very little direction and assistance from 
the prosecution.  Only the police have access to witnesses’ inconsistent 
statements, hesitations, and misidentifications made during the 
investigation.  Although the ultimate duty to evaluate the case and decide 
what to disclose falls upon the prosecution, none of that discretionary 
decision making can occur unless the police disclose what they have 
uncovered. 
 It would have been better to insist that police make extensive notes 
regarding their investigations and strictly mandate that all information be 
turned over to the prosecution.  Recordkeeping advances truth seeking.190  
Imposition of a bad-faith requirement permits police to bury information 
with the excuse that they did not know they were supposed to disclose it, 
and gives tacit permission to leave the tape machine off, fail to record 
witness interviews and tips, and to keep street files.191 
3. Fabrication of Evidence:  False Confessions and Fake Science 
 When a police officer creates false information likely to influence a 
jury’s decision and passes that information along to prosecutors, he or she 
violates the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial,192 and that harm is 
actionable.193  False evidence can be concrete:  a suspect’s bootprint 
 
 189. Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d at 662. 
 190. See generally David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie:  Litigating Police 
Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455 (1999). 
 191. “Street files” are police files withheld from prosecutors.  See, e.g., Jones v. 
City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 995 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 192. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 
103, 112 (1935)). 
 193. Manning v. Miller, 355 F.3d 1028, 1030-31 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
appellee’s claim was actionable because the FBI agents did not qualify for immunity 
when they provided a jailhouse informant with details of the crime they wanted to 
charge the accused with and induced him to create a false story); Spurlock v. 
Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1006-07 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that the appellant was not 
protected by either absolute or qualified immunity because his actions, which included 
manufacturing a false statement by a jailhouse informant, violated the accused’s clearly 
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planted at the scene of the crime in order to “solidify” the evidence,194 or 
intangible:  a “confession,” the details of which were suggested to the 
suspect.195 
 Confessions are powerful evidence of guilt.196  While many varieties 
of evidence are equivocal, a confession is generally direct, straightforward, 
and inculpatory.  Imagine a homicide investigation:  A married woman is 
killed at home.  She was having an affair.  She had an insurance policy 
benefiting her husband.  After her corpse is found, police discover that a 
ground floor window in the home is open.  There are fingerprints on the 
window frame that do not match those of anyone who lives in or regularly 
visits the home.  If the husband claimed to have returned from work to find 
his wife lying murdered on the carpet, he would be suspected and 
investigated, but the police would probably continue to pursue other leads 
while they questioned him.  However, if the husband confessed, the case 
would likely be closed.  The jury would find the evidence against the 
husband convincing.  The open window would be explained away.197  Until 
recently, jurors refused to believe that innocent people confessed to crimes 
they did not commit.198  Thus, confessions were trusted, and attempts to 
deny confessions were not. 
The power of confessions encourages police to obtain them in as 
many cases as possible.  That desire prompts police to spend time 
interrogating suspects and encourages hard-to-detect cheating, such as 
feeding details to the suspect so that the resulting statement will have 
convincing verisimilitude. 
Courts have held that it is a violation of a suspect’s constitutional 
 
established constitutional rights). 
 194. Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1289 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 195. Stano v. Dugger, 901 F.2d 898, 902-03 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 196. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 182 (1986) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“No other class of evidence is so profoundly prejudicial.”). 
 197. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 87, at 429 (“Because a confession is 
universally treated as damning and compelling evidence of guilt, it is likely to dominate 
all other case evidence and lead a trier of fact to convict the defendant.  A false 
confession is therefore an exceptionally dangerous piece of evidence to put before 
anyone adjudicating a case. In a criminal justice system whose formal rules are 
designed to minimize the frequency of unwarranted arrest, unjustified prosecution, and 
wrongful conviction, police-induced false confessions rank amongst the most fateful of 
all official errors.”). 
 198. Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution:  Safeguards 
Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 134 (1997). 
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rights to induce a false confession and use it against the suspect at trial.199  
Moreover, arranging for the target of an investigation to be lodged in a jail 
cell with a known informant—who had previously falsified information and 
perjured himself—and then using the resultant overheard confession is 
actionable if the confession is proved to be false.200 
No arrest, no matter how lawful or objectively reasonable, gives an 
arresting officer or his fellow officers license to deliberately 
manufacture false evidence against an arrestee. To hold that police 
officers, having lawfully arrested a suspect, are then free to fabricate 
false confessions at will, would make a mockery of the notion that 
Americans enjoy the protection of due process of the law and 
fundamental justice.201 
Courts have not hesitated to find a constitutional violation, and juries 
have not hesitated to award damages.  In May 2004, a Long Island jury 
awarded Shonnard Lee two million dollars because police arrested him 
without probable cause and lied when they said Lee had confessed.202 
C.  Suits Against Defenders for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Courts are reconsidering their traditional disinclination to hold public 
defenders liable for those actions that directly contributed to wrongful 
convictions.  Currently, while courts have refused to extend immunity 
protection to public defenders, they have not yet dismantled the barriers 
that make “it difficult for criminal defendants to sue their counsel.”203  For 
example, “[o]n the one hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that when a 
public defender” acts as an individual attorney representing an individual 
client, “that lawyer is not a state actor and is thus not amenable to suit 
under the federal civil rights laws.”204  On the other hand, state malpractice 
tort theory is difficult to use against public defenders.205  Moreover, some 
 
 199. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (affirming the 
“clearly established” test of voluntariness in determining that use of a coerced 
confession violates due process). 
 200. Manning v. Miller, 355 F.3d 1028, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 201. Ricciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 124 F.2d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 202. Chau Lam, $2M in Faulty Arrest; Jury Concludes Ex-LI Man Was 
Charged Without Sufficient Evidence and That Cops Fabricated Confession, NEWSDAY 
(Long Island, N.Y.), May 19, 2004, at A7. 
 203. Adele Bernhard, Exonerations Change Judicial Views on Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2003, at 37, 41. 
 204. Id. (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981)). 
 205. Id. 
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“states treat individual public defenders as civil servants with individual 
immunity.”206  Finally, “damages won against public defender offices are 
often capped.” 
Commentators abhor these protections because they see them as 
violations of accuseds’ rights and obstacles to improving the performance 
of public defenders.207  “Their voices are being heard.”208 
In Nevada, a former client of the public defender in Clark County 
claimed the defender organization used the polygraph exam to 
differentiate between clients.209  “Miranda claimed that the chief defender 
required” all clients to undergo lie detector tests “and provided fewer 
investigative and defense resources to those who failed.”210  Miranda 
asserted this practice was a deliberate pattern—not an isolated instance—
and that it was part of an unwillingness to properly supervise and train 
attorneys.211  “Miranda claimed that no investigation was conducted on his 
case as a result of the test results.”212 
            Affirming the district court determination, the Ninth Circuit 
found that Miranda’s allegations, if proven, would be sufficient to 
 establish against the public defender office and the county a claim of 
deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, reachable under the 
leading Supreme Court decisions on state and municipal liability, such 
as Monell v. Department of Social Services.213 
 It is unlikely that another public defender office has used polygraph 
tests as Miranda alleged Nevada did.214  But unfortunately, “[m]ost public 
defender organizations provide little guidance”—in training or 
 
 206. Id. (citing Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 407 N.Y.S.2d 103, 105 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1978)). 
 207. Id. (citing Harold H. Chen, Note, Malpractice Immunity:  An Illegitimate 
and Ineffective Response to the Indigent-Defense Crisis, 45 DUKE L.J. 783 (1996); David 
A. Sadoff, Note, The Public Defender as Private Offender:  A Retreat from Evolving 
Malpractice Liability Standards for Public Defenders, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 883 (1995); 
David J. Richards, Note, The Public Defender Defendant: A Model Statutory Approach 
to Public Defender Malpractice Liability, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 511 (1994)). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. (citing Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 210. Id. at 41-42. 
 211. Id. at 42. 
 212. Id. (citing Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d at 468). 
 213. Id. (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). 
 214. Id. 
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supervision—to their staff.215  Following the lead of the Miranda decision, 
other innocent public defender clients, upon release from jail, are likely to 
sue the defender office that provided representation for its failure to train 
and supervise staff.216  “The Miranda v. Clark County decision condemned 
an affirmative policy as systemically ineffective, but there is no reason why 
another organization’s omissions or failures might not likewise be 
considered bureaucratic malfeasance establishing liability.”217 
As more innocent individuals are exonerated, the public and courts 
will demand more from police and prosecutors.218  “The police are already 
paying for careless work through larger jury verdicts and settlements. . . .  
The defense bar may find itself in the same position soon.”219 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 In the absence of generous, practical, and popular compensation 
statutes, exonerees will turn to the courts for vindication.  Eventually their 
lawsuits will be successful.  Exonerees have compelling stories and 
sympathetic claims.  Moreover, each exoneration reveals unprofessional, if 
not criminal, law enforcement activity.  While compensation statutes are 
more equitable—and ultimately less expensive for states—courts will not 
wait for the legislature to act. 
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